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The Islamic Republic of Iran remains the recognized governing authority of Iran — with no revolutionary regime-change, no de-facto collapse into protracted civil war, and no political transition to a non-clerical system — through end 2029?

As of 8 Oct · 16:59 UTCResolves 31 Dec 20295 movers0 pressure moments
Timeline A · Regime HoldsReality
78%
Crowd 89%Gap +11

Iran's clerical leadership holds intact through 2029. The Supreme Leader's office consolidates succession planning around chosen allies. Oil exports continue flowing to China at current levels, funding security forces and state institutions. Street protests remain scattered and manageable—the broad mobilization seen after Mahsa Amini's death in 2022 has not reignited into coordinated regime challenge. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tightens its grip on military, judiciary, and economic sectors without visible fracture.

Timeline B · Regime FallsReality
22%
Crowd 11%Gap −11

By end 2029, Iran's clerical system has fractured or collapsed. A sharp drop in oil revenue, cascading protest waves, or open conflict between regime factions (Supreme Leader versus IRGC, or hardliners versus pragmatists) breaks the state's capacity to govern. The government loses control of cities or provinces, or a non-clerical force seizes power through uprising or coup. The Islamic Republic as a recognized state entity ceases to function as currently structured.

crowd 89
The quiet paththe one nobody’s watching

ISIS-K attack or Israeli bombing campaign reshapes Iranian state survival outside current A-B frame.

6%
The read
The pattern favors Regime Holds (70%) over Regime Falls (20%). Repression apparatus is intact, succession planning is advanced, and no credible organized opposition has emerged inside the country — but Khamenei is 86 and the handover is the single biggest known stress-test.

The Islamic Republic has absorbed four major protest waves since 2009 (Green Movement, 2017-18 austerity protests, 2019 fuel-price riots, 2022-23 Mahsa Amini uprising) without losing control of the security apparatus. The IRGC runs the economy, Basij runs the streets, and the clerical establishment runs succession. The system's defining structure — the Supreme Leader's authority plus the IRGC's commercial empire — remains intact. Regime Falls requires either (a) a security-apparatus split during Khamenei succession, (b) a mass uprising that captures provincial military units, or (c) an external shock (Israeli strike + regional war + economic collapse all compounding). Any one of these is low probability; all three combined is the primary tail risk the next 4 years.

Where reality is heading

A, 80% bandCrowd today
Projected reality support to 31 Dec 2028A rises from 41% to about 52% with an 80% band of 33 to 71. B falls from 53% to about 44%. Quiet path near 4 to 6%. Crowd today: A 55%.100%7550250Crowd today · A 89%A ~52%B ~44%P ~4%NowJan 2027Jan 202831 Dec 2028
Reality crosses toward A in early 2028. Today’s crowd number sits at the top of A’s band, possible but optimistic. View as table

The movers, ranked by leverage

01
Ali KhameneiSupreme leader; succession timing determines whether transition happens in crisis or calm
leverage 0
Conditional
02
IRGC Qods Force and commercial wingControls both external operations and large parts of domestic economy; a split here is the primary civil-war scenario
leverage 0
Conditional
03
US administration (post-2026 and 2028 elections)Sanctions intensity and diplomatic posture directly modulates economic stress
leverage 0
Conditional
04
Israeli Prime MinisterDecision to strike Iranian soil is the most consequential external shock
leverage 0
Conditional
05
Chinese government and state oil companiesOil purchases are the main sanctions-circumvention channel
leverage 0
Conditional

What would change our mind

Signals toward A
  • IRGC and Basij command structure retains unified chain of command through at least two major protest cycles between now and 2029
  • Assembly of Experts publicly signals a succession plan or de facto successor before Khamenei's death
  • Iran's non-oil export economy (petrochemicals, steel, agriculture) continues to grow annually per Central Bank of Iran data despite sanctions
  • Oil exports via China sustain above 1 million barrels per day on a 12-month rolling average per Kpler or Vortexa tanker tracking
Signals toward B
  • A protest cycle larger than the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini wave by participation estimates (ACLED, HRANA) emerges and sustains past 90 days
  • Documented defection of a provincial IRGC or regular army unit (brigade-size or larger) to protesters
  • Open rift inside the Assembly of Experts over succession becomes publicly reported in multiple independent outlets
  • Hyperinflation re-accelerates past 60% annually with rial losing a further 50% of value against USD on parallel market

Evidence