LiveUS-China & global orderWestern cycleAnchors pending

US semiconductor export controls extended to cover advanced packaging, HBM memory, and lithography-adjacent tooling by end 2026; China's SMIC/YMTC domestic production of sub-7nm chips reaches 15-20% of domestic demand by 2028?

As of 6 Oct · 22:12 UTCResolves 31 Dec 20262 movers0 pressure moments
Timeline A · Full BifurcationReality
75%
Crowd 90%Gap +15

By end of 2026, the US expands semiconductor export restrictions beyond chips to include advanced packaging technologies (chiplets, 3D stacking), high-bandwidth memory (HBM), and equipment used in next-generation lithography. Commerce Department adds these categories to the Entity List and coordinates with allies to enforce similar controls. SMIC and YMTC remain bottlenecked on mature-node production, unable to scale domestically to meet more than 10-15% of China's sub-7nm demand by 2028.

Timeline B · Managed RivalryReality
25%
Crowd 10%Gap −15

The US does not broaden export controls past current chip restrictions through 2026, citing implementation costs and allied coordination breakdown. Advanced packaging and HBM tooling remain available through Singapore and Japan resellers. SMIC achieves 18-22% domestic market share in sub-7nm nodes by 2028 through incremental yield improvements and sustained investment, reducing China's reliance on imports.

crowd 90
The quiet paththe one nobody’s watching

Taiwan Strait military escalation or full US-China emergency trade war bypasses the controlled-expansion scenario entirely.

6%
The read
The underlying structure favors Managed Rivalry (75%) over Full Bifurcation (25%) — the signal is strong.

Two trajectories through us-china & global order: Managed Rivalry and Full Bifurcation. The Signals below describe what would be visible if each trajectory is landing; the Levers list what could bend it. The third timeline — the one neither Managed Rivalry nor Full Bifurcation captures — is where the honest scope-limit sits.

Where reality is heading

A, 80% bandCrowd today
Projected reality support to 31 Dec 2028A rises from 41% to about 52% with an 80% band of 33 to 71. B falls from 53% to about 44%. Quiet path near 4 to 6%. Crowd today: A 55%.100%7550250Crowd today · A 90%A ~52%B ~44%P ~4%NowJan 2027Jan 202831 Dec 2028
Reality crosses toward A in early 2028. Today’s crowd number sits at the top of A’s band, possible but optimistic. View as table

The movers, ranked by leverage

01
US export-control severity tierDetermines whether tech decoupling stabilizes or accelerates
leverage 0
Conditional
02
Multilateral institution reform paceDetermines whether Global South remains inside G7-adjacent frameworks or defects to BRICS+
leverage 0
Conditional

What would change our mind

Signals toward A
  • Under this timeline dominance, the US-China rivalry is managed through selective decoupling in strategic sectors (semiconductors, AI, biotech) while preserving multilateral coordination on climate, pandemics, and financial stability
  • G20 and expanded G7+ frameworks absorb BRICS demands via institutional reform (IMF quota revisions, UN Security Council expansion discussions)
  • dollar retains reserve-currency status through 2035 but yuan/euro/gold share rises to 25-30% of reserves
  • tech decoupling stabilizes as a 'small yard, high fence' equilibrium with defined export-control regimes and cross-border data agreements
  • Taiwan status quo preserved via strategic ambiguity + deterrence-plus-engagement
Signals toward B
  • Under this timeline dominance, the rivalry accelerates into full bifurcation
  • US-led bloc (US, UK, Japan, Australia, India-tilt, GCC-tilt) vs China-led bloc (China, Russia, Iran, Central Asia, portions of Africa and Latin America) with hardened tech, financial, and security perimeters
  • dollar weaponization (SWIFT exclusions, secondary sanctions) accelerates yuan-settlement in China-bloc trade to 40-50% by 2032
  • BRICS+ moves toward hard-currency alternative (gold-backed settlement, mBridge CBDC network)
  • Taiwan crisis brought forward to 2027-2030 window as US commitment credibility tested

Evidence